By Lauren Estrin and Ted Davis of Kilpatrick StocktonLauren Estrin is an associate in Kilpatrick
Stockton’s Intellectual Property Department. She focuses her practice on trademark prosecution
and litigation, and also handles unfair competition, false advertising, and copyright disputes.
Ted Davis is a partner in Kilpatrick Stockton’s Intellectual
Property Department. He divides his practice between domestic and international litigation and
client counseling in the fields of trademark, copyright, false advertising, and unfair competition law. Mr.
Davis has served as a member of both the Board of Directors of INTA and the governing Council
of the American Bar Association’s Intellectual Property Law Section.
As many industries and markets are learning, piracy and counterfeiting is now a
global economic epidemic. In the first half of 2006, over 25% of all the reported incidents of IP
theft around the world were linked to venues such as street vendors, outdoor markets, and counterfeit
purse parties, all prototypical markets for knock-off merchandise.1 Counterfeiting affects IP owners
everywhere and the problem is not industry-specific – art, fashion and footwear designers,
builders, car manufacturers, and pharmaceutical companies to name a few, all share this unwanted and
injurious experience. Vaccinating world markets from counterfeit goods, which now comprise at
least 7% of all international trade, is no easy task. Given the movement of these goods
throughout world ports, coordinating protection and enforcement efforts among a variety of actors is an
imperative. And yet, the United States has only begun to pool its own resources and initiatives in
recent years.
Recognizing the need for counterfeiting and IP enforcement in the U.S., on February
7, 2007, Senators George Voinvoich (R-OH) and Evan Bayh (D-IN) introduced S.522, styled as the
Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Act (“IPREA”), legislation intended to create a
coordinated, comprehensive domestic and international intellectual property enforcement
scheme. The IPREA is nearly identical to legislation Senators Bayh and Voinvoich both presented
unsuccessfully in 2005. Whether this legislation has a better chance of passing remains
unclear. A report issued by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) in
November 2006, however, highlighted the shortcomings in the current counterfeit enforcement
programs and called for a more effective national strategy to combat counterfeiting and
piracy.2 With some
momentum created by the GAO’s report and support from a variety of entities in both the
private and public sector, the proposed IPREA could be a viable attempt at fashioning a coordinated
enforcement scheme that finally takes on one of the most potent threats to IP rights worldwide.
The Current Landscape
The two government programs currently charged with IP enforcement against
counterfeiters are the National Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council
(“NIPLECC”) and the Strategy for Targeting Organized Piracy
(“STOP”). NIPLECC was created by Congress in 1999 to lead U.S. efforts in
protecting IP rights at home and abroad. It was charged with creating a strategy for IP
enforcement and given a supervisory role in the implementation of its proposed strategy. In the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Congress augmented the NIPLECC program by creating the
position of Coordinator for International IP Enforcement to serve as the director of NIPLECC.3 Congress also appropriated
an additional $2 million to NIPLECC for expenses through the 2006 fiscal year.4
Also, in October 2004, President Bush created the Strategy for Targeting Organized
Piracy (“STOP”) to coordinate various government agencies in fighting global piracy and
the counterfeit trade. STOP’s “mission statement” describes its task as
“the most comprehensive initiative ever advanced to smash the criminal networks that traffic in
fakes, stop trade in pirated and counterfeit goods at America’s borders, block bogus goods
around the world, and help small businesses secure and enforce their rights in overseas
markets.”5
STOP has helped facilitate efforts among the Departments of Commerce, Homeland Security, Justice,
and State, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Food and Drug Administration.
STOP has garnered more coordinated action among these entities and has actually been successful in
implementing programs to help facilitate the protection and enforcement of U.S. IP rights.
Together with participating agencies and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(“USPTO”), STOP has taken concrete steps to provide U.S. businesses with valuable
information and resources to protect their IP and enforce their rights both at home and abroad.
Indeed, it is seen by many in both the public and private sectors, as the more prominent enforcement
scheme to date.
For example, some of the programs STOP has initiated include:
- creating a hotline to provide U.S. businesses with information about how to enforce their IP rights
at home and abroad;
- offering brand and piracy protection strategies to businesses through the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and Coalition Against Counterfeiting and Piracy “No Trade in Fakes”
program;
- empowering U.S. district courts to issue injunctions against counterfeit goods entering U.S. ports;
- working with the Department of Justice to update criminal penalties for counterfeiting and actually
prosecuting counterfeiters under available criminal laws;
- engaging China in respecting IP rights by creating a full time IP attaché to help
monitor IP violations in China, conducting the first coordinated U.S.-Chinese enforcement action,
seizing over 210,000 counterfeit DVDs, in addition to other enforcement and investigation efforts; and
- creating an Office of Enforcement in the USPTO to help foreign and domestic IP owners enforce
their rights in the United States and within trade agreements.
Despite these activities, as the GAO report notes, STOP is only “a good first
step.”6 It
lacks permanence and is not set up to address long-term goals or ensure accountability in any way.
NIPLECC recently adopted STOP as part of its strategy for international IP enforcement, however, it is
still unclear how NIPLECC will fulfill its oversight and accountability functions.7 Moreover, as the distinction between
NIPLECC and STOP blurs and STOP faces an expiration date in 2008, the national strategy may be due
for reorganization, especially considering how these two entities operate in practice. To that
effect, the IPREA could be a well-timed overhaul.
Second Time’s A Charm
The IPREA seeks to coordinate IP intelligence and enforcement efforts across
federal, state, and local government entities, the private sector, and other countries facing similar
counterfeiting problems. The IPREA largely mirrors its failed predecessor S. 1984, which
Senators Bayh and Voinvoich introduced in November 2005.
The IPREA takes on the widespread counterfeit and piracy trade. The bill
notes significant counterfeiting is occurring in the drug, automobile and aviation-part industries, which
affects the health and safety of Americans.8 The bill also cites many national interests, varying from
counterfeiting, terrorism, and protecting U.S. jobs and business interests as the basis for its
findings.9
To protect a myriad of industries and IP owners domestically and overseas, the
IPREA proposes establishing an interagency coalition to monitor and enforce IP rights and prevent
piracy.10 The
“Intellectual Property Enforcement Network” or “IPEN” would be an
interagency coalition, consisting of various cabinet members and led by the Deputy Director for
Management of the Office of Management.11 The organization and tasks of IPEN were designed to mirror the
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, the domestic and international system currently regulating, with
reported success, money laundering and other financial crimes.12
IPEN would be charged with establishing policies and initiatives to combat
counterfeiting and piracy. Specifically, IPEN would have enforcement duties to stop
counterfeiting and piracy of goods worldwide, including “disrupting and shutting down counterfeit
and piracy networks.”13 IPEN would also be responsible for collecting information about
individuals and groups involved in counterfeit activities and sharing such information with other
government agencies to further the protection of U.S. IP interests worldwide.14
The bill also contemplates that IPEN would work with “like-minded
countries” by establishing an international task force to set international policies and standards
for IP enforcement.15 The international task force would be comprised of countries who
share the same interest in protecting domestic and international IP rights and combating counterfeiting
and piracy in the worldwide market.16 With a formal mechanism in place, the IPREA hopes to provide
countries with a forum to share information and help facilitate individual members’ enforcement
efforts.
Interestingly, IPREA seeks to build coalitions, not only among various federal
executive agencies and “like-minded” countries, but also among state and local
governments and entities in the private sector.17 The IPREA seeks to create an exchange of information among
the countries of the international task force, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of
Justice, state and local governments, and the private sector. The bill charges IPEN to incorporate
the private sector by “building a formal process for consulting with companies, industry
associations, labor unions, and other interested groups” within the countries that are part of the
international task force.18 Indeed, the bill makes a point of including small and medium-
sized businesses, which was absent from its failed predecessor S.B.1984.19 If the IPREA seems far-reaching, it
is. Indeed, the IPREA seems to engage actors and groups on nearly every level to overhaul IP
enforcement on a comprehensive scale.
In addition to enforcing international IP rights, one of the bill’s goals is to
enforce IP-related trade agreements.20 The IPREA provides that information collected and reported to
IPEN and the international task force would also be used to help the U.S. Trade Representative enforce
trade agreement violations, specifically against countries and parties in violation of the World Trade
Organization’s IP provisions.21
Conclusion
The IPREA is certainly an ambitious piece of legislation whose likelihood of passage
remains uncertain. It has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee and awaits a formal
testimony and vote. If successful, the IPREA could be the long-awaited antidote to curb rampant
counterfeiting and design piracy. Even if passed, however, the amount of valuable IP vested in
U.S. industries needs muscle to enforce these rights across the globe. Without more aggressive
legislation at home and coordinated international efforts, more shipments of knock-offs and counterfeit
goods will continue to infiltrate U.S. and other ports, infecting world markets and hurting the success of
business and owners of IP worldwide. The IPREA’s effect will depend on its
implementation. Nevertheless, if Congress can look to the strengths of STOP and inadequacies
of the NIPLECC, the U.S. could help lead the international fight against costly large-scale IP violations.
Endnotes
| 1 |
See 2006 Mid-Year Counterfeit & Piracy Intelligence Report,
www.goldsec.com. |
| 2 |
Government Accountability Office, Intellectual Property: Strategy for Targeting
Organized Piracy (STOP) Requires Changes for Long-Term Success (2006) (“The GAO
Report”). |
| 3 |
See The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-
447, Div. B, Title II. |
| 4 |
See id. |
| 5 |
See U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet,
available at www.ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/STOP_FS100404.htm. |
| 6 |
See The GAO Report, supra note 2, at 4. |
| 7 |
See id. |
| 8 |
See Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement Act, S.522, 110th
Cong. § 2(4). |
| 9 |
See id. § 2. |
| 10 |
See id. § 4(a). |
| 11 |
See id. |
| 12 |
See id. § 2(14). |
| 13 |
See id. § 4(c)(2)(A, D). |
| 14 |
See id. § 4(c)(2)(B-D). |
| 15 |
See id. § 4(c)(2)(F). |
| 16 |
See id. § 4(c)(3). |
| 17 |
See id. § 4(e)(4),(5). |
| 18 |
See id. § 4(c)(3)(E). |
| 19 |
See id. § 4(e)(5). |
| 20 |
See id. § 4(e)(3)(c). |
| 21 |
See id. § 4(e)(3)(D). |