By James R. Klaiber 1Patent reexamination is already a tricky process. For accused infringers, the
decision to seek reexamination is sensitive because the asserted patent may be stronger if a
reexamination certificate issues. For patent owners, reexamination face the risk of cancellation,
as well as resulting in the de facto delay of any assertion efforts.
The Federal Circuit’s recent Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arthur
A. Collins, Inc. decision2 adds a new wrinkle to the law of reexamination. It has been more
than a decade since the Federal Circuit first held that a reexamination amendment that fails to comply
with the requirements of the reexamination statutes results in the invalidity of the affected
claim.3 In most
such situations, the claim is pronounced invalid because it conflicts with the statutory prohibition on
“enlarging the scope” of claims prosecuted during reexamination.4 But the Federal Circuit’s
unpublished Southwestern Bell II decision held, for the first time, that claims added for an
“improper purpose” can be invalidated in later litigation even if they are not impermissibly
broadened and were not challenged by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office during
reexamination.5
This decision counsels a cautious approach for prosecutors characterizing the amendments they make
during ongoing reexaminations, as well as adding another invalidity arrow to the quivers of litigators
defending against reexamined patents.
Amendments Under the Reexamination Statutes
The original reexamination statutes of the patent code include 35 U.S.C.
§§301-307, which were enacted December 12, 1980.6 Among these was § 305, whose
second and third sentences read as follows:7
§ 305 Conduct of Reexamination Proceedings
…In any reexamination proceeding under this chapter, the patent owner will be permitted to
propose any amendment to his patent and a new claim or claims thereto, in order to distinguish the
invention as claimed from the prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 of this title, or in
response to a decision adverse to the patentability of a claim of a patent. No proposed amended
or new claim enlarging the scope of a claim of the patent will be permitted in a reexamination
proceeding under this chapter.
The legislative history of the reexamination statutes reveals that they were enacted
with the intent of achieving three principal benefits. Reexamination of patents by the United
Stated Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) would “(i) settle validity disputes more
quickly and less expensively than litigation, (ii) allow courts to refer patent validity questions to an
agency with expertise in both the patent law and technology, and (iii) reinforce investor confidence in
the certainty of patent rights by affording an opportunity to review patents of doubtful
validity.”8
The Federal Circuit has noted that the record of both the interested public and the Congress
“reflect a serious concern that reexamination not create new opportunities for abusive tactics
and burdensome procedures.”9 Accordingly, “the PTO was authorized to reexamine an
issued patent only within strictly defined limits.”10 These limits have been summarized by the Federal
Circuit as follows:11
Even when the door to the reexamination gate is opened, the PTO is not freed from the limitations
Congress placed on the reexamination process. Whatever the basis on which reexamination is
granted, it was intended to deal only with substantial new questions of patentability, essentially those
based on prior art that was not before the examiner during an earlier examination.
Thus, the longstanding precedent of the Federal Circuit has been that reexamination
proceedings are limited to the narrow statutory mandate enacted by Congress.
The Freeman Decision
The particular restrictions contained in § 305, and reproduced above, were first
addressed by the Federal Circuit in In re Freeman.12 Dr. Freeman applied for and was granted a U.S.
patent, which was later reissued with additional claims.13 Dr. Freeman then sued an alleged infringer in a U.S.
district court, which construed the claims and found the patent to be both invalid and not infringed
under that construction.14 The district court’s construction and non-infringement
holding was affirmed on appeal to the Federal Circuit.15 Upon filing reexamination of his reissued patent, Dr.
Freeman “admittedly amended the reissue claims to avoid this [i.e., the district court’s]
interpretation of the claims.”16 The PTO examiner rejected the amendments as impermissibly
broadened under § 305, which was affirmed by the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.17 On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s
holding, finding that Dr. Freeman had indeed broadened his claims in violation of § 305.18 The Court also
addressed, in dicta, Dr. Freeman’s argument that he should be allowed to “relitigate the
issue of the scope of the reissue claims during reexamination:”19
[T]he ability of a patentee to amend claims during reexamination must be seen in light of the
fundamental purpose of reexamination – the determination of validity in light of a substantial
new question of patentability. Thus, amendment of claims during reexamination is limited to
amendment in light of prior art raising a substantial new question of patentability.20 Dr. Freeman has never
argued that the amendments to the last clause of each of the independent reissue claims were made to
distinguish those claims from any prior art. Rather, during reexamination, Dr. Freeman candidly
stated that “the claims have been amended in this proceeding consistent with [his] amendments
and purpose in filing the reissue application but now with the benefit and knowledge as to how a reader
could misconstrue [his] intent.” It is clear that the amendments to the last clause of each
of the independent reissue claims had nothing to do with a substantial new question of
patentability.
Thus, Dr. Freeman’s amendments were made neither to “distinguish
the invention” from the prior art cited in his reexamination, nor “in response to a
decision” rejecting his claims, which are the only reasons “permitted” for
amendments under § 305. The Freeman decision did not address what effect,
if any, these unpermitted amendments would have on the validity of a patent in later litigation.
Post-Freeman Adjudications of Allegedly Improper Amendments Under §
305
Several district courts have relied on Freeman to invalidate claims that
were amended for reasons not specifically permitted by § 305, even though the holding in
Freeman itself did not reach that far. In Total Containment Inc. v. Environ
Products Inc., a patentee proposed new claims during reexamination after rejection of the
originally pending claims.21 In a later paper, the patentee added another claim, stating that it
“could not have been presented earlier, since the undersigned did not become aware of a third
party sump riser unit until after receipt of the August 31, 1993, Office Action.”22 After a bench trial, the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania court analyzed whether claim 19 was invalid in view of this prosecution
history record:23
[T]he court must determine whether the amendments were submitted to distinguish the invention
from prior art cited in the reexamination request or in response to a decision adverse to the
patentability of a claim of the patent. . . . This requires an inspection of the file histories for the patents
in suit.
* * * *
Claim 19 does not comply with the statute. It was submitted because of a potentially infringing
apparatus, not because it distinguished the invention from prior art raising a substantial new question of
patentability. It violates 35 U.S.C. § 305 and is, therefore, invalid.
Notably, the Total Containment court characterized
Freeman as holding that a “claim submitted during reexamination was properly
rejected by the PTO when patentee’s attorney admitted that the amendment had nothing to do
with a substantial new question of patentability.”24
A similar result was reached in Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic AVE, Inc.
(“Cordis I”).25 There, after a rejection by the PTO, the patentee submitted a
response paper that amended the original claims and added new claims, which included the following
remarks:26
Claims 1, 13, 24, 35 and 37 have been amended in accordance with the discussions with Examiner
Thaler at the above-noted interviews, and in subsequent telephone discussions on July 13, 1998.
Added claims 44-59 are all narrower in scope than the original claims, and provide specific protection
for aspects of the disclosed invention which have been incorporated into competitive products and
methods.
After a jury verdict finding the new claims invalid, the patentee moved for judgment
of law that § 305 had not been violated.27 The Delaware district court reviewed the analysis in
Freeman, noting that there was “no indication in the prosecution history that claim
44 was added to distinguish the invention as claimed from the prior art, or in response to the original
rejection of claim 1 for obviousness.”28 After finding that “claim 44 was added solely to cover
competitors’ stents, and not for a permissible reason under § 305,” the court denied
the patentee’s motion, letting the invalidity judgment stand.29
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling.30 Noting that the
reexamination paper at issue also stated that it was “[r]esponsive to the Office Action
mailed June 1, 1998,” the Federal Circuit held that new claim 14 was not submitted for an
improper reason and was therefore not invalid for violation of § 305. In doing so, the
presence of the remarks accompanying claims added in reexamination was analyzed as
follows:31
Section 305 does not require the patent owner to include an express statement that the new claims
distinguish the prior art or remarks indicating how the new claims distinguish the prior art
references. If the claims fail to distinguish the prior art, the claims will be rejected on the
appropriate grounds; for that reason, it may frequently be in the patent owner’s interest to
include such remarks, but they are not necessary to satisfy section 305.
Notably, the Federal Circuit did not anywhere address the reasoning of
Freeman in reaching its conclusion.32
While the Cordis appeal was pending, in Southwestern Bell
Telephone, L.P. v. Arthur A. Collins, Inc. (“Southwestern Bell
I”), a third district court held invalid claims added for reasons unpermitted by §
305.33 Collins,
the patentee, had asserted its patent against Northern Telecom (“Nortel”) in the Eastern
District of Virginia, receiving a summary judgment of non-infringement later affirmed by the Federal
Circuit.34
Collins initiated reexamination, and before a PTO rejection issued, submitted a Patent Owner’s
Statement stating that it was adding new claims “to preclude any interpretation of the claims in
accordance with the district court’s opinions... in the litigation with Nortel.”35 The added claims were
deemed patentable by the PTO, and were the subject of a later declaratory judgment action by
Southwestern Bell against Collins in the Northern District of Texas.36 In granting summary judgment of
invalidity of the added claims, the Texas court noted that “Collins has presented no evidence to
contradict its stated purpose for amending the ‘589 patent.”37 The court cited Freeman
and held that “preclusion of the application of a prior claim construction is not a proper purpose
for amendment under 35 U.S.C. § 305.”38 The Texas court later granted summary judgment of non-
infringement, and Collins appealed both holdings.39
On appeal, Collins argued that it properly initiated reexamination, as its
reexamination request cited “all prior art references that were raised during the previous Nortel
litigation.”40 Collins also asserted that the newly-added claims “were
narrower in scope to distinguish the prior art raised” by Nortel, and that its remarks merely
“provided the PTO with [Collins’s] views on the proper construction of the subject
claims.”41 Collins attempted to distinguish Freeman on the
basis that there was no finding by the Texas court that the added claims were improperly broader than
its original claims.42
Southwestern Bell countered that the Texas court properly invalidated the added
claims, again relying on the language of Collins remarks in its Patent Owner’s
Statement.43
Southwestern Bell also pointed out that Collins had failed, both in its arguments before the Texas court,
as well as in its appellate brief, “to identify what, if any, specific prior art or adverse decision by
the examiner motivated [Collins] to add 12 new claims.”44
The Federal Circuit’s Southwestern Bell II Decision
In its unpublished Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arthur A. Collins, Inc.
(“Southwestern Bell II”) decision dated May 27, 2008, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Texas district court’s ruling that the reexamination claims added by Collins
were invalid as resulting from “reexamination for improper purpose.”45 The Court, relying on
Freeman, held that “[c]laim amendments during reexamination are limited to
amendment in light of prior art raising a substantial new question of patentability.”46 In agreeing with the
reasoning of the Texas court, the Federal Circuit noted there was “no evidence” that
Collins had added its new claims for any reason other than to overcome the previous adverse claim
construction ruling by the Virginia district court.47 Accordingly, the Court held, for the first time, that claims are
invalid if added for a purpose unpermitted by § 305.
The ruling in Southwestern Bell II is arguably not consistent with the
holding in Cordis II. The Cordis II panel did not address the
Court’s previous Freeman decision. In addition, the panel in Cordis
II appeared to discount the patentee’s stated reasons for adding reexamination claims, a
position somewhat at odds with the Federal Circuit’s other precedent, which supports analyzing
the prosecution history to determine the reasons for amendments.48
Conclusion
Prosecutors should take note of the Southwestern Bell II decision, as it
teaches that all reexamination claim amendments and additions should be characterized, if at all, as
distinguishing over the prior art or responsive to a PTO rejection, and that any unnecessary comments
regarding other possible purposes should be omitted. Under Southwestern
Bell II, litigators potentially have a new tool to invalidate reexamined patent claims
if the prosecution history supports amendment for improper purpose. Furthermore, because
Festo dictates that the purpose of an amendment must be determined on the prosecution
history alone,49
arguments for invalidity based on this reason may be well-suited for summary judgment.
Endnotes
| 1 |
James R. Klaiber is a registered patent
attorney at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, practicing intellectual property litigation. |
| 2 |
No. 2007-1577,2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11274 (Fed. Cir. May
27, 2008) (“Southwestern Bell II”). |
| 3 |
Quantum Corp. v. Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1995). |
| 4 |
§ 305; see, e.g. Quantum at 65 F.3d 1583-
84; Thermalloy, Inc. v. Aavid Eng’g, 121 F.3d 691, 694 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Anderson v. International Eng'g & Mfg., 160 F.3d 1345, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
1998). |
| 5 |
Southwestern Bell II, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
11274, at **5-6. |
| 6 |
Pub. L. 96-517, §1, Dec. 12, 1980, 94 Stat. 3016. |
| 7 |
Id. Section 305 was later amended, with
no change made to this portion. Pub. L. 98-622, Title II, §204(c), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3388. |
| 8 |
In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786,
789 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir.
1985); see also House Report No. 96-1307 (Part I) at 3-4, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. and
Adm. News at 6462-6463 (“Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of questions about the
validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation [and] could
be conducted with a fraction of the time and cost of formal legal proceedings…”). |
| 9 |
Id.at 110 F.3d 790 (quoting In re
Recreative Technologies Corp. 83 F.3d 1394, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). |
| 10 |
Portola Packaging,
110 F.3d. 786, 789. |
| 11 |
Id. at 791. |
| 12 |
30 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1994). |
| 13 |
Id. at 1462. |
| 14 |
Id. |
| 15 |
Id.at 1463. |
| 16 |
Id. at 1466. |
| 17 |
Id. at 1464. |
| 18 |
Id. at 1469. |
| 19 |
Id. at 1468-69 (citing In re
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984). |
| 20 |
The court noted that “[c]laims may also be amended
to comply with 35 U.S.C. § 112 during reexamination.” Id. at 1468, n.5
(citing In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 856 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (in banc), cert
denied 474 U.S. 828 (1985)). |
| 21 |
921 F.Supp 1355, 1383 (E.D. Pa. 1995). |
| 22 |
Id. |
| 23 |
Id. at 1382-1383 (citing Freeman,
30 F.3d. 1459, 1468). |
| 24 |
Id. at 1383. |
| 25 |
194 F. Supp. 2d 323, 351-353 (D. Del. 2002);
rev’d 511 F.3d 1157 (Fed. Cir. 2008). |
| 26 |
Id. at 352 (emphasis omitted). |
| 27 |
Id. at 351. |
| 28 |
Id. at 352-3. |
| 29 |
Id. at 353. |
| 30 |
Cordis II, 511 F.3d 1157, 1184-5. |
| 31 |
Id. at 1185. |
| 32 |
Id. |
| 33 |
464 F. Supp. 2d 588, 595-596 (N.D. Tex. 2006);
aff’d in relevant part, Southwestern Bell II, 2008 U.S. App. Lexis
11274. |
| 34 |
Id. at 596 (citing Arthur A.
Collins Inc. v. Northern Telecom Ltd., 216 F.3d 1042 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). |
| 35 |
Id. at 596. |
| 36 |
Id. at 590. |
| 37 |
Id. at 596. |
| 38 |
Id. |
| 39 |
Brief of Defendant/Counterclaimant-Appellant Arthur A.
Collins Inc. at 3-4, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arthur A. Collins,
Inc., No. 2007-1577, 2008-1026 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 26, 2007). |
| 40 |
Id. at 58. |
| 41 |
Id. at 58-59. |
| 42 |
Id. at 59; see also Reply Brief of
Defendant-Appellant Arthur A. Collins Inc. at 28-29, Southwestern Bell Telephone
Co. v. Arthur A. Collins, Inc., No. 2007-1577, 2008-1026 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 24,
2008). |
| 43 |
Corrected Brief of Plaintiff-Cross Appellant Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. at 51-53, Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Arthur A. Collins,
Inc., No. 2007-1577, 2008-1026 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 18, 2008). |
| 44 |
Id. at 53. |
| 45 |
No. 2007-1577,2008 U.S. App. Lexis 11274, at **5-6 (Fed.
Cir. May 27, 2008). |
| 46 |
Id.(citing Freeman at 30 F.3d
1468). |
| 47 |
Id. |
| 48 |
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1366-67 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Test for applying prosecution history estoppel
requires determining if “the reason for that amendment was a substantial one relating to
patentability”); Conoco, Inc. v. Energy & Environmental In’l, L.C., 460
F.3d at 1349, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Claim “added merely to correct an obvious omission”
was not amended for reasons of patentability.); Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister,
Inc. 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (Addition of a claim “intended to cover a
competitor’s product” is proper if it “compl[ies] with all statutes and
regulations;” that “source,” standing alone, is “irrelevant” to
inequitable conduct.). |
| 49 |
Festo, 344 F.3d 1359, 1367. |