By Joseph E. RootAfter a career as patent counsel and general counsel, in-house and out, Mr. Root has
launched QualiPat, aimed at providing IP training, outsourcing facilitation, and IP projects. He can be
contacted at jroot@qualipat.com.
Generals are often accused of re-fighting the last war, and sometimes they
are. During the 1930’s, André Maginot and the French general staff were horrified
at the specter of a return to the trench warfare of World War I, so they build a series of impregnable
fortifications, designed to safeguard the Republic into the distant future. He expected to be
remembered as the savior of France; instead, he became an icon for backward-looking strategy, when
the Germans moved tanks through the “impassable” Ardennes, substituted dive bombers
for artillery, and overran France in a matter of weeks.
Old strategy is considerably harder to replace than old weapons. By 1965 the
US employed few World War II armaments, but it was determined to apply the “lesson” of
Munich by standing firm against the tide of Communism in Vietnam. A generation later the same
reasoning can be heard about Iraq, on both sides.
Figuring out the lessons of history is the real job of the strategist, and it’s
hard. Take a straightforward question: Would the US leaving Iraq in 2007 be more like
the US leaving Vietnam in 1975, an act with relativel...
